​The dangerous-condition exception to CGIA immunity applies if the injury resulted from: 1. The physical condition of the courthouse; 2. which constituted an unreasonable risk to health or safety; 3. about which the County reasonably knew or should have known; 4. which was proximately caused by the County’s negligent act or omission in maintaining the courthouse. Id. at ¶ 15.

The parties disputed the fourth factor.

Plaintiff argued she only had to show the County had notice of the spill to prove the dangerous-condition exception applied. The County argued that the reasonableness of its response to the spill was relevant to the fourth factor and whether the spill was proximately caused by the County’s negligence. Id. at ¶ 16.

​The Supreme Court stated that a plaintiff’s burden to prove a public entity waived immunity is relatively lenient. A plaintiff’s burden is a prima facie showing when the court relies only on documentary evidence and does not need to engage in factfinding to decide a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Id. at ¶ 19. But, a plaintiff’s burden is a likelihood standard when the jurisdictional facts are inextricably intertwined with the merits. Id. at ¶ 24. Under the likelihood standard, a plaintiff must show a likelihood or reasonable probability of success on the merits. Id. at ¶ 21.

This standard is more exacting than a prima facie showing.

It ‘involves factfinding rather than merely making a ruling of law regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to present a fact question.’ But it’s less demanding than the preponderance standard, as the court’s findings are ‘limited to probable outcomes as opposed to definitive findings of fact.’

Id. at 21 (internal citations omitted).

​As applied to this case, the trial court’s factual findings showed that only a few minutes lapsed between the County being notified of the condition and the plaintiff falling. The supreme court agreed with the trial court’s conclusion that the County did not have a reasonable time to warn or clean it up. Id. ¶ 37. Therefore, the supreme court held plaintiff failed to establish that the County’s failure to warn of, or clean up, the spill was a negligent omission that proximately caused the condition and thus plaintiff failed to prove the County waived immunity. Id. ¶ 38.

​The court of appeals was tasked with applying this standard for the first time and held that an officer’s failure to use his lights or siren until the last five or ten seconds of his pursuit could have contributed to the collision; therefore, the trial court’s granting of immunity was reversed and the plaintiff’s claims reinstated. Id. at ¶ 15.

The rationale for treating a tenant’s guest as the landlord’s invitee [as opposed to a social guest/licensee] is that part of the landlord’s business, and part of the consideration the landlord receives from the tenant, relates to holding common areas open for the use of tenants and their guests. Id. at ¶ 18.

​The PLA defines a landowner broadly as (1) “an authorized agent or person in possession of real property,” and (2) “a person legally responsible for the condition of real property or the activities conducted or circumstances existing on real property.” Id. at ¶ 13.

​The purpose of CRUS is to encourage landowners to make their land available for recreational use. Id. at ¶ 17. An owner who invites or permits, without charge, any person to use their land for recreational use does not incur liability for injury to such person, unless the landowner willfully or maliciously fails to guard or warn against a known dangerous condition. Id. at ¶ 19.

TWO STEPS DETERMINE WHETHER CRUS APPLIES.

First, whether the defendant was an owner of land under CRUS. If so, whether the defendant invited or permitted, without charge, anyone to use the land for recreational purposes. Id. at ¶ 21. A defendant must satisfy both conditions. Id.

​As these terms apply to Qwest, there was no evidence that Qwest invited anyone to use the sidewalk for recreational purposes or that it took any action to entice or assist recreational users to use the sidewalk. Id. ¶ 43. Further, Qwest did not permit anyone to use the sidewalk for recreational purposes. There is no evidence that Qwest had any authority under the CDOT permit to restrict use of the sidewalk for recreation. Id. ¶ 48. Therefore, Qwest was not shielded from liability under CRUS. Id. ¶ 49.

​The court determined that the relevant ordinance to show the standard of care in this PLA claim was the edition in effect at the time the children were injured. Id. at ¶ 56. The court reasoned that the plaintiffs’ claims under the PLA were premised on a dangerous condition in the unit, i.e. non-compliant smoke alarms, that existed on the night they were injured, not a dangerous condition on an earlier date. Id. at ¶ 53.

2025 CO 17

​The court distinguished intentional torts as those where the actor intends the result of the conduct or knows the conduct is likely to bring about the result; whereas willful and wanton conduct encompasses acts and omissions committed purposely but without regard to the consequence. Id. at ¶ 27.

Estate of Ross v. Public Service Co., 2025 COA 31 ¶¶ 65-70, cert. granted Nov. 17, 2025

​First, the “felonious killing exception” to the noneconomic damages cap in the Wrongful Death Act applies to corporations and individuals, so corporations that commit felonious killings are subject to uncapped noneconomic damages in wrongful death claims. Id. at ¶¶ 33-34.

​Second, federal regulation 49 C.F.R. section 192.614 requires pipeline operators [here, Public Service Co.] to inspect pipelines that could be damaged by excavation activities, but does not require operators to supervise or inspect the excavation activities themselves. Id. at ¶ 55.

​Third, in a wrongful death case involving multiple defendants, the noneconomic damages cap applies on a per claim basis, not a per-defendant basis, before apportioning damages based on each defendant’s percentage of fault.

Ramirez v. KLM Construction, 2025 COA 99

​Plaintiff filed a complaint against KLM under the Premises Liability Act. KLM then asserted that the plaintiff’s damages were limited by C.R.S. section 8-41-401(3) of the WCA, which states that a corporate officer who rejects workers compensation insurance cannot bring a workers compensation claim under the WCA, but they can bring a common law cause of action for work related injuries, but the damages are capped at $15,000 of recovery. Further, the statutory cap is not applicable in a cause of action brought against “another not in the same employ.” See C.R.S. §§8-41-401(3).

​The court looked for guidance in the Colorado Supreme Court’s opinion in Pulsifer v. Pueblo Professional Contractors, Inc., 161 P.3d 656 (Colo. 2007), where the meaning of another not in the same employ was analyzed.

​The court found that All City was a corporation, a legal entity separate and distinct from its corporate officers. Id. at ¶ 30. Plaintiff’s role in forming the agreement was limited to acting as an agent of the corporation. Id. The record did not demonstrate that plaintiff or KLM otherwise agreed that plaintiff was a party to the plumbing services agreement. Id. at ¶ 31. The principal parties to the agreement were KLM and All City and plaintiff was not a principal party. Id. Therefore, KLM was a third party to plaintiff and KLM was not another not in the same employ as plaintiff, so plaintiff’s damages were not subject to the cap. Id.

Gilley v. Oviatt, 2025 COA 27

At trial plaintiff presented testimony from five of her treating doctors about her injuries, the treatment provided and that all of her medical care was reasonable, necessary, and related to the collision. Id. at ¶ 4.

​Plaintiff also presented testimony from an expert witness regarding her future life care plan and past medical treatment, who testified that the cost of her life care plan was reasonable and necessary. Id. at ¶ 5.

Finally, plaintiff presented testimony from an economic expert, who testified to the total of her past medical expenses, which he derived from a 199-page admitted exhibit (“medical bills exhibit”) that contained all of her medical bills. Id. at ¶ 6.

At the conclusion of both parties’ cases-in-chief, defendant moved for a directed verdict arguing plaintiff did not lay foundation for the reasonable value of her past medical expenses; none of the treating doctors testified that the amounts of their bills were reasonable; and, there was insufficient evidence to admit the medical bill exhibit, so the jury could not use the exhibit to determine the reasonable value of the medical costs. Id. at ¶ 7. The court denied the motion for directed verdict and the jury found for the plaintiff.

​In its appeal, the defendant alleged the trial court erred in denying the motion for directed verdict on the bases the plaintiff failed to prove her medical expenses were (1) actually incurred and (2) were reasonable. Id. at ¶ 10.

In terms of proving the medical expenses were actually incurred,

the court of appeals began its analysis by stating that to recover past medical expenses, a plaintiff must prove the expenses were reasonable, necessary and incurred as a result of the injury. Id. at ¶ 13. Plaintiff’s incurred medical expenses were established by the medical bills exhibit, which was considered in combination with the treating doctors explaining their treatment (which was reflected in the medical bills exhibit) and how the treatment was reasonable, necessary, and related to the collision. Id. at ¶ 21.